Finally, by writing explicitly the expression for A, (t,, t,), the proof of the theorem becomes straightforward.
Proof of theorem 2 By using the hints given in the proof of theorem 1 with the framework provided in [3] , this delay bound can be proved easily.
Complexity of CBFQ:
It is easy to prove that after serving a packet, the order of the terms in step 4 of the algorithm above does not change except for the queue that has just been served. In this case the sorting is not a full sort but just an insertion of an element (either the queue that has just been served, or a queue that just became active) in an already sorted list. Besides, since the counters are independent, the update operation in step (v) can take place in parallel making the complexity of step (v) equal to O(1). With these remarks and all the other operations being O(l), the complexity of the algorithm becomes the same as the complexity of a search algorithm: O(log(J)). Compared to the alternative approaches, this constitutes a major advancement towards practical implementations. In addition, since the values of the counters are bounded, numerical overflow problems would not occur in our algorithm.
Conclusion:
A new scheduling algorithm CBFQ for packetswitched networks has been proposed. Based on a set of counters that keep track of the credits earned by each traffic stream, CBFQ decides which stream is to be served next. The CBFQ algorithm achieves the same fairness and delay bounds as the alternative algorithms such as SCFQ while having a lower computational overhead and requiring hardware for practical implementation. (2) . More explicitly, for any specific key K, the ciphertext Y is related to the plaintext X by the simple affine relation Y = MKX 0 dK where MK is an n x n non singular binary matrix and dK is an n X 1 binary vector where n is the block length of the cipher. This renders this family of ciphers completely insecure as it can be broken with only n + 1 linearly independent plaintext blocks and their corresponding ciphertext blocks.
DeJnitions and cipher description:
The cipher proposed in [l] is described by the authors as follows:
A parity circuit layer of length n, or simply an L(n) circuit layer, is a Boolean device with an n-bit input and an nbit output, characterised by a key that is a sequence of n symbols from {O, 1, -, +}. An example (given in [l]) of C(n,d) with n = 10, and d = 3 is shown in Table 1 . Table 1 : C(n,d) with n = 10, and d = 3
Main result: The Lemma below follows from the fact that the set of affine functions is closed under the XOR operation.
Lemma I :
of the Boolean canonical form of C(n, dj, defined to be the maximum of the order of its product terms, increases exponentially as n or d increases, and hence it is practically infeasible to cryptanalyse C(n, dj if n t 64 and d t 8. The following theorem shows that this is not true.
Interferometry with Faraday mirrors for
ised using only XOR gates is an affine function over GF (2) . 
where AdK is an n x n non-singular binary matrix and dK is an n x 1 binary vector. Prooj Eqns. 2 and 3 can be expressed as 
Conclusion:
The private key cryptosystem proposed in [l] is affine over GF (2) and hence it is completely insecure. In cryptography, safety is normally obtained by exchanging a secret key between the two users, Alice and Bob. In quantum cryptography (QC) the key is exchanged through a quantum channel. Its security is based on the fact that any measurement of a quantum system will inevitably modify the state of this system. Therefore an eavesdropper, Eve, might obtain information out of a quantum channel by performing a measurement, but the legitimate users will detect her and hence not use the key. In practice, the quantum system is a single photon propagating through an optical fibre, and the key can be encoded by its polarisation or by its phase, as first proposed by Bennett However, all quantum cryptography systems face two main difficulties. The first problem is the need for continuous alignment of the system. In polarisation-based systems, the polarisation needs to be maintained stable over tens of kilometres, in order to keep Alice and Bob's polarisers aligned. In interferometric systems, usually based on two unbalanced Mach-Zehnder interferometers, one interferometer has to be adjusted to the other every few seconds to compensate for thermal drifts [4] . The second problem is the high noise of photon counters at 1300nm which essentially determines the error rate (ER) of the key.
In this Letter, we present the creation of a secret key over 23 km of installed telecommunications fibre using a recently introduced interferometric system with Faraday mirrors [6] . This phasecoding setup needs no alignment of the interferometer, nor polarisation control. It features excellent fringe visibility and stability. Moreover, we show that the performance of Ge-APD photon counters can be considerably improved using fast active biasing electronics. 
Fig. 1 Schematic diagram of interjerometric QC system with Faraday mirrors
Our novel quantum cryptography scheme is shown in Fig. 1 . In principle, we have an unbalanced Michelson interferometer at Bob's (beamsplitter C2) with one long arm going to Alice. The KOYAMA, K., and TERADA, R.: 'Nonlinear parity circuits and their laser pulse impinging on C2 is split in two pulses, P1 and P2. P2 cryptographic applications'. Advances in CrYPtologY: Proc.
propagates through the short arm first (mirror M2 then M1) and CRYPT0'90, (Springer-Verlag, 1991), pp. 582-599 then travels to Alice and back, whereas P1 is going to Alice first 2 WEBSTER, A F., and TAVARES, s.E.: 'On the design of S-boxes'. and passes through the short arm on its way back. Both pulses Advances in Cryptology: Proc. CRYPTO'85, (Springer-Verlag, follow exactly the same path and will interfere at C2. To encode 1986), pp. [523] [524] [525] [526] [527] [528] [529] [530] [531] [532] [533] [534] their bits, Alice is acting with her phase modulator (PM) only on
